

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 030235
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY PM/ISO:JEBURGESS/NEA/ARP:JWTWINAM:CEJ
APPROVED BY P:PHABIB
NEA:ALATHERTON
OSD/ISA:LJANKA
NAVY: (OP-61):RADM BARROW (INFO)
PM:GCHURCHILL
AF/I:WHELEWIS
S/S: MR. SEBASTIAN

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P 100223Z FEB 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VICTORIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 030235

EXDIS - FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MORG, PK, KE, IR, BA, MU, SA, MP

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SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST FORCE - THE NEW FORMAT

REF: MANAMA 244

1. FOR SEVERAL MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN INTENSE EFFORT WITHIN
USG TO DEVISE SOME ACCEPTABLE FORMULA TO PERSUADE BAHRAIN
TO REVERSE ITS 1975 DECISION TERMINATING THE US MIDDLE

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AFFECTED EMBASSIES, ITS OWN PORT LIAISON/SUPPORT PERSONNEL ON AN AS-NEEDED, WHERE-NEEDED, BASIS. YOUR ASSESSMENT, REQUESTED BELOW, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT ON EMBASSY OPERATIONS OF MORE FREQUENT MIDDLE EAST FORCE PRESENCE IN YOUR COUNTRY.

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DRAFTED BY: PM/ISO:JEBURGESS:ML
APPROVED BY:PM/ISO: GTCHURCHILL
NEA/ARP - J. LYLE
S/S/O-:S.GOLDSMITH

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P 102050Z FEB 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 030235

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 30235 ACTION ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, MUSCAT,
NAIROBI, TEHRAN, VICTORIA, PORT LOUIS, INFO MANAMA, DHAHRAN,
ABU DHABI, DOHA, KIWAIT DTD 10 FEB 77.

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S/S-O:RGAMBLE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0000

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

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EXDIS MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

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COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, MIDEASTFOR WOULD AS NECESSARY REDUCE ITS SUPPORT FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN BAHRAIN, INCLUDING REMOVING DEPENDENTS. IF NEGOTIABLE, THE REMAINING SHORE REQUIREMENTS IN BAHRAIN WOULD BE A SMALL STAFF TO ADMINISTER LOGISTIC AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR THE SHIPS, AND CREW REQUIRED TO OPERATE THE FLAG AIRCRAFT.

7. THE KEY TO OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE WILLINGNESS OF AREA STATES TO ASSURE LONGER AND MORE FREQUENT FLAGSHIP VISITS. THE TWO DESTROYERS ROUTINELY DEPLOYED FROM THE ATLANTIC FLEET ARE ATTACHED TO MIDDLE EAST FORCE FOR APPROXIMATELY FOUR MONTHS AND DO NOT REQUIRE EXTENDED IN-PORT PERIODS TO CONDUCT EITHER THEIR MISSION OR SELF-MAINTENANCE. WE ENVISION NO CHANGE IN DESTROYER VISIT PATTERNS. THE FLAGSHIP, HOWEVER, IS PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED IN THE REGION, AND THUS REQUIRES A COMBINATION OF BRIEF PORT VISITS AND LONGER MAINTENANCE PERIODS. APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF ITS TIME IS SPENT IN PORT ANNUALLY. SOME SELF-MAINTENANCE CAN, IF NECESSARY, BE CONDUCTED AT ANCHOR, BUT SOME TIME ALONGSIDE A PIER IS

ESSENTIAL. IDEALLY, AT LEAST FOURTEEN CONSECUTIVE DAYS ARE REQUIRED FOR SELF-MAINTENANCE PORT VISITS. SUCH MAINTENANCE WE HAVE HITHERTO ACCOMPLISHED ALMOST SOLELY AT BAHRAIN, WHERE THE FLAGSHIP HAS TRADITIONALLY SPENT AN AVERAGE OF ABOUT SIX MONTHS TOTAL PER YEAR, WITH THE EXCEPTION DURING 1976 OF A FIVE-MONTH OVERHAUL IN THE PHILIPPINES. THE PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE THE FLAGSHIP IN BAHRAIN THREE TO FOUR MONTHS TOTAL PER YEAR. TO DO THIS, A TOTAL OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS OF SELF-MAINTENANCE PERIODS WOULD HAVE TO BE ARRANGED ELSEWHERE. MIDEASTFOR WILL ALSO NEED TO RECEIVE OCCASIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT FLIGHTS DELIVERING SPARE PARTS, CRITICAL ITEMS, ETC. (THIS IS NOW DONE AT SUCH MAJOR PORTS AS KARACHI FOR NON-MIDEASTFOR SHIPS OPERATING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, MIDEASTFOR WOULD NOT SEEK TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF EMBASSY SUPPORT NORMALLY FURNISHED

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FOR PORT VISITS. IN FACT COMIDEASTFOR HAS OFFERED TO REDUCE THIS BURDEN BY PROVIDING, IN COORDINATION WITH AFFECTED EMBASSIES, ITS OWN PORT LIAISON/SUPPORT PERSONNEL ON AN AS-NEEDED, WHERE-NEEDED, BASIS. YOUR ASSESSMENT, REQUESTED BELOW, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT ON EMBASSY OPERATIONS OF MORE FREQUENT MIDDLE EAST FORCE PRESENCE IN YOUR COUNTRY.

8. WHILE THE CURRENT GENERAL REGIONAL PATTERN OF THREE TO FOUR DAY SHIP VISITS WOULD CONTINUE, THE GOAL WOULD BE TO SECURE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF EXTENDED VISITS TO VARIOUS PORTS TO MEET THE FLAGSHIP'S NEEDS. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF PORTS AND ANNUAL VISIT FREQUENCY/DURATION THAT WOULD AFFORD SEVERAL COMBINATIONS FOR REALIZING THIS GOAL:

PORTNO. PER YR./DURATION EACH (WEEKS)

BANDAR ABBAS OR BUSHIRETHREE/TWO

MOMBASATWO/TWO

KARACHITWO/THREE

DAMMAN/JIDDATWO/TWO

MUSCATTWO/TWO

SEYCHELLESTWO/TWO

MAURITIUSTWO/TWO

PORT SUDANTWO/TWO

9. REQUEST SOONEST YOUR ASSESSMENT, WITHOUT REPEAT, WITHOUT ANY DISCUSSION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, OF LIKELIHOOD
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GOVERNMENTS IRAN, KENYA, PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, MAURITIUS, SUDAN AND SEYCHELLES, WOULD GIVE COMMITMENT TO ASSURE MIDDLE EAST FORCE FLAGSHIP PROPOSED EXTENDED VISITS. YOUR ASSESSMENT SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THE BAHRAINIS DESIRE TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLICLY THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE AGREED TO SHARE IN SUPPORT OF REGIONAL MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE. IT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF HOW POSSIBLE COMMITMENT FOR INCREASED MIDDLE EAST FORCE SUPPORT BY HOST GOVERNMENTS WOULD AFFECT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND OUR AREA SECURITY INTERESTS.

10. RE MIDEASTFOR DETERMINATION TO MINIMIZE BURDEN ON ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES OF EMBASSIES IN QUESTION, SHOULD ADDRESSEES FEEL NEED FOR MORE DETAILED ELABORATION OF MECHANICS INVOLVED PRIOR TO COMMENTING ON FEASIBILITY OF THIS PROPOSAL, COMMANDER MIDDLE EAST FORCE IS AVAILABLE TO DISCUSS THIS DIRECTLY AT YOUR REQUEST.

11. FOR JIDDA AND TEHRAN: PLEASE ALSO GIVE YOUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT AS TO WILLINGNESS OF SAG AND GOI TO COME OUT WITH A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR BAHRAIN'S MAINTENANCE OF MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE, SHOULD SUCH STATEMENT BE USEFUL IN NEAR FUTURE.

12. FOR ISLAMABAD: WE REALIZE THAT A RESPONSE IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IN VIEW OF OTHER CURRENT US-PAK ISSUES. FOR SAKE OF CURRENT PROPOSAL, WE SUGGEST YOUR REPLY BE BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT THESE ISSUES WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO ANY POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP OF MIDDLE EAST FORCE.

13. FOR NEW DELHI: WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED ABOVE.

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Message Attributes

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Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Event:
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